COUNTERPOINT TO STALINGRAD. Operation Mars (November-December 1942)

Frustration, Fury, and Defeat

Having failed to exploit their opportunities west of the Rzhev-Sychevka road and now starved of ammunition and logistical support, Colonel Arman's 6th Tank Corps and cooperating cavalry had no choice but to attempt a breakout to the east. On the night of 29-30 November, the force launched a desperate breakout attempt in coordination with fierce Soviet attacks from within the Vazuza River bridgehead. In bitter and chaotic fighting which cost Arman nearly all of his remains 100 tanks, the bulk of the corps' personnel broke out of encirclement⁵⁹. The more fragile cavalry fared even worse and were mercilessly slaughtered by withering German fire. Many of the cavalrymen made it out of the encirclement, but some did not. The Tadzhik cavalrymen of Colonel Kursakov's 20th Cavalry Division could not, and for weeks they fought alongside Soviet partisans within the salient before the remnants of the force finally reached Soviet lines in the Luchesa River valley in early January⁶⁰.

A German eyewitness of the costly breakout recorded that, at day's end, "The battlefield was spotted with dead and wounded, a view which the oldest veteran cannot forget."⁶¹ The Soviet 6th Tank Corps commander reported, "Tens of our soldiers suffered heroic deaths in this heavy combat, among whom were the commanders of the 200th Tank Brigade and 6th Motorised Rifle Brigade... who died leading the attack."⁶² The intense combat took its toll on the Germans, as described by a 5th Panzer Division participant, who wrote:

Again, a heavy day of fighting had come to an end. All enemy attacks had been repulsed. But there was no doubt that the limits of our soldiers' load-bearing capability had been reached, and, in many cases, it had already been exceeded. The kampfgruppe [combat group] leaders reported that soon there would be complete apathy perceptible in soldiers of all ranks due to the severe overstress caused by the lack of sleep, severe cold, insufficient supplies and incessant combat activity⁶³.

Zhukov was bitterly disappointed. General Kiriukhin's 20th Army had lost over 30,000 men and 200 tanks in 5 days of vicious combat. Losses in the 31st Army were just as severe, and little had been gained by the effort. Even more disconcerting, on the west side of the salient, the 41st Army's seemingly certain victory soon degenerated into catastrophic rout, and 22nd Army soon faced frustrating stalemate.

South of Belyi, General Solomatin's worst fears materialized. Not only were the Germans able to hold on to Belyi, but they were also able to orchestrate an effective counterstroke. The situation began deteriorating after 1 December, after Solomatin had shortened his corps' front and gone on the defense. First, between 2 and 6 December, the German XXXXI Panzer Corps' 1st Panzer Division and the newly arrived 12th Panzer Division regained firm control of the Belyi-Vladimirskoe road, cut off and destroyed Colonel Dremov's isolated 47th Mechanized Brigade northeast of Belyi, and began applying unremitting pressure to Solomatin's defense lines southeast of the city⁶⁴. Even more devastating for the Soviets, the German XXX Army Corps, with the 19th and 20th Panzer Divisions, began concentrating south of the Soviet Belyi salient. It was no mean task, since every German movement was contested by the terrible weather conditions, the abysmal roads, and intense resistance by Soviet partisans⁶⁵. Despite these difficulties, by 6 December XXX Corps units were in a position to strike back at the Soviet 41st Army. They did so on the morning of 7 December against the 41st Army's southern flank, while the 1st Panzer Division and the Grossdeutschland Division's Fusilier Regiment attacked southward from Belyi.

In three days of intense fighting, the combined German force slashed through the 41st Army's rear area and encircled the bulk of Tarasov's army southeast of Belyi. The glorious Soviet thrust had degenerated into an inglorious trap. General Solomatin, who was assigned command of all encircled Soviet forces, did what he could to organize a breakout, but all initial attempts to escape failed. Abandoned by his army commander, Solomatin ordered the troops of his and Colonel Popov's 6th Rifle Corp to dig in, organize all-round defense, and wait until help could reach them⁶⁶.

Soviet progress further north in the Luchesa River valley promised no relief. Despite strenuous efforts, General Iushkevich's forces in that sector could achieve little more. Having lost about half of its initial manpower and even more of its tanks, his 22nd Army lacked the strength to expand its sizable penetration. Nor could the Germans eliminate it. Although intense fighting ebbed and flowed for days, the stalemate endured. Further north, General Zygin's 39th Army continued its slow progress at the northern apex of the Rzhev salient against stout German resistance with little prospect for significant victory.

Zhukov responded to the depressing news from the Belyi sector with characteristic resolution. Unwilling to admit defeat, he orchestrated a massive build-up of forces in the 20th Army's sector along the Vazuza River. Between 2 and 10 December, he reinforced Kiriukhin's army with the fresh 5th Tank Corps and with several divisions transferred from the 31st Army, he hastily reconstituted Colonel Arman's 6th Tank Corps with tanks received from the Stavka reserve, and he reinforced Lieutenant General M. S. Khozin's adjacent 29th Army to twice its original strength⁶⁷. While the fighting raged on at Belyi, Zhukov ordered the 20th and 29th Armies to resume their assaults on 11 December in concert with a fresh drive in the north by General Zygin's 39th Army, which he reinforced with a stream of divisions from the 30th Army in the Rzhev sector.

The new act in the developing drama began playing out in the Vazuza River bridgehead on the morning of 11 December. At 1010 hours massed Soviet infantry from the 20th and 29th Armies, supported by all remaining infantry support tanks, resumed their attacks from and south of the Vazuza River bridgehead. Despite withering German fire, Konev and Kiriukhin committed the almost 350 tanks and 20,000 men of his new 5th and refurbished 6th Tank Corps into combat. So hastily organized was the attack that many of the new tanks had not received their coat of white camouflage paint. Attacking with abandon across a 4-kilometer sector into the teeth of reinforced German antitank defenses, the desperate assault cost Soviet 20th Army about 300 tanks lost in 2 days of incessant and deadly combat⁶⁸. A Soviet 5th Tank Corps account captured the grim and futile nature of the combat:

A rocket rising into the air signaled the attack. All those around came to life. The cries of "Forward!" and "For the Fatherland!" resounded across the field. It was 1010 hours on 11 December 1942. The first to rush forward were the regiments of the 20th Army's 243rd and 247th Rifle Divisions. Soon, however, their forward ranks were forced to take cover against the heavy enemy fire. A fierce, bloody battle began, which lasted all day. The attack misfired almost along the entire extent of the penetration front. Then, the brigades of the 5th Tank Corps were committed into battle. They began literally to chew their way through the enemy defense. The tank assaults gave way to furious enemy counterattacks. Individual heights and the most key positions changed hands several times. The entire battlefield was covered with destroyed and burning tanks and smashed guns - both sides suffered heavy losses⁶⁹.

Although the carnage was frightful in the attack sectors of both the 20th and 29th Armies, Zhukov and Konev urged their forces on. The assaults continued for three days before collapsing in utter exhaustion on 15 December. The German Ninth Army's situation report for 15 December recorded the last agonies of the Soviet 20th Army, stating:

...along the eastern front, the enemy has once again launched a large-scale attack. Disappointed by failure in all front sectors and with an almost limitless application of force, the enemy wanted, once more, to try to find a weakness on the eastern front and force a decision. This attack was spearheaded by even greater massed use of tanks. Executed in a narrow area..., he tried to collapse our front with superior human efforts. However, in such a short period and in such a narrow region, it caused enemy tank losses that exceeded those of the heavy tank battles at Rzhev during the summer. Within 48 hours 300 tanks were shot up in a sector only 4 kilometers wide⁷⁰.

By that time, all from the lowliest private to Zhukov himself realized that defeat was at hand. If the carnage along the Vazuza River did not confirm that reality, then the fate of Solomatin's force at Belyi would.

The 41st Army's encircled force of about 40,000 men commanded by General Solomatin held out southeast of Belyi for as long as humanly possible. Finally, the absence of any support from the 41st Army, the unrelenting pressure by the four encircling German panzer divisions, and the dwindling logistical stocks forced Solomatin to act, lest his isolated force be entirely destroyed . Solomatin orchestrated his breakout on the night of 15-16 December. Shrinking his perimeter defense, he destroyed his remaining armor and heavy weapons and thrust westward with his remaining infantry. Running the fiery gauntlet, Solomatin saved what he could of his corps and the accompanying forces of Popov's 6th Rifle Corps. The cost, however, was devastating. The German 1st Panzer Division alone counted over 102 Soviet armored vehicles destroyed, and Solomatin reported over 8, 000 of his 12,000 troopers killed and wounded and most of the corps' over 200 tanks destroyed or abandoned⁷¹. The toll in the remainder of Tarasov's 41st Army was equally grim, totaling over 200 tanks and 10s of 1,000s of riflemen.

Even the twin catastrophic Soviet defeats along the Vazuza River and at Belyi did not totally destroy Zhukov's resolve, for, despite being thwarted on the flanks of the Rzhev salient, Zhukov continued to attack with the 39th Army in the north until mid-December. Despite Zhukov's stubborn defiance of reality, by 15 December Operation Mars was a shambles. Stalin, the Stavka, and perhaps even Zhukov himself knew well that Mars was at an end. Furthermore, long before, Stalin had abandoned any hopes of launching Operation Jupiter. By early December 1942 the bulk of Stavka reserves were already en route southward to reinforce Vasilevsky's successful Operation Uranus at Stalingrad.