COUNTERPOINT TO STALINGRAD. Operation Mars (November-December 1942)

Assault

Zhukov's offensive began early on 25 November simultaneously against the eastern, western, and northern flanks of the German Rzhev salient²⁴. Preceded by vicious artillery preparation, infantry and supporting tanks of Western Front's 20th and 31st Armies' struck hard at the defensive positions of German XXXIX Panzer Corps along and north of the Vazuza and Osuga Rivers northeast of the vital German rail head of Sychevka. Although the Germans expected an attack soon, the assault caught the defenders at an awkward moment, when their 78th Infantry Division was in the midst of conducting a relief-in-place of 5th Panzer Division forces along the Vazuza²⁵. Numbering well over 200,000 men and 500 tanks, the 2 Soviet armies faced about 40,000 German defenders. Despite this numerical superiority and initial German confusion, the violent attack achieved only mixed results since German forces occupied strong defenses, and Soviet forces had to assault across generally open and rolling terrain at a time when incessant fog and driving snow showers reduced the effectiveness of the Soviet artillery preparation.

North of the Osuga River, the German 102nd Infantry Division successfully repelled repeated assaults by 20,000 infantry and over 100 tanks of 3 Soviet 31st Army divisions²⁶. Soviet infantry clad in winter white advanced in echelon, their ranks interspersed with supporting tanks. German artillery, machine guns, and small arms fire tore gaping holes in the ranks of the assaulting infantry as antitank weapons picked off the accompanying tanks. For three days and at a cost of more than half of their riflemen and most of their tanks,, the Soviets hurled themselves in vain at the 102nd Division's prepared defenses²⁷. Faced with this determined resistance, the 31st Army's assault collapsed, and, despite Zhukov's and Konev's exhortations, it could not be revived. Three 20th Army rifle divisions attacking between the Vazuza and Osuga Rivers met the same grisly fate. Despite strong armored support, their attacks stalled after suffering frightful losses²⁸. Undeterred by the initial failures, the carnage increased as Zhukov and Konev insisted the attacks continue to support operations further south.

To the south, along the banks of the frozen Vazuza River, a single rifle division of Major General N. I. Kiriukhin's 20th Army achieved signal, if limited success. Taking advantage of the Germans' temporary confusion, Major General G. D. Mukhin's 247th Rifle Division, supported by tank brigade of about 50 tanks, lunged across the frozen Vazuza River, tore through forward German positions, and seized 2 German fortified villages on the river's western bank²⁹. Exploiting the opportunity, General Kiriukhin quickly moved Colonel P. F. Berestov's 331st Rifle Division across the river and into the breech. Fierce fighting raged all day in the rolling open country west of the river as Soviet infantry struggled to overcome pesky German village strong points and expand the bridgehead. It was critical they do so, for Konev and Kiriukhin planned to commit their second echelon 8th Guards Rifle Corps and their mobile group, the 6th Tank and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, into the breech to enlarge the bridgehead and exploit the operation westward³⁰. All day, exhorting, cursing, and cajoling, Zhukov, Konev, and Kiriukhin urged their men on. By day's end, although the bridgehead was still too small, Konev decided to accept the risk and ordered Kiriukhin's second echelon and mobile group to advance the next morning.

This decision, however, turned out to be premature and ill-advised because the hard-pressed German forces offered stubborn and desperate resistance. Caught midst their complex regrouping, both 5th Panzer and 78th Infantry Division troops fought with grim abandon. Small ad hoc German combat groups [kampfgruppen] of infantry, tanks, and artillery in company and battalion strength fiercely defended their hedgehog defenses around the numerous log and stone villages that dotted the generally open, rolling, and snow-covered fields west of the Vazuza River. Attacking Soviet forces lapped around these defenses, overcame some, but left many as deadly obstacles strewn throughout their rear area. Beset by command, control, and communications problems, the German XXXIX Panzer Corps could not appreciate the chaos their fragmented resistance was causing in Soviet ranks. Nevertheless, the corps took desperate measures to shore up its sagging defenses and ordered its reserve 9th Panzer Division, then in camp west of Sychevka, to march to the sounds of the guns and plug the developing breeches.

The Soviet command also appreciated the gravity of the situation. On the night of 25-26 November, while Mukhin's and Berestov's riflemen strained to expand their tenuous bridgehead, Soviet second echelon and exploitation forces struggled forward. Under constant German artillery fire, over 200 tanks, 30,000 infantry, and 10,000 cavalrymen, with their accompanying logistical trains, moved inexorably forward through the murky darkness along 2 frozen dirt roads through the light forests to the east bank of the river. Since both roads had been unmercifully chopped up by artillery fire, and too many forces were using them at the same time, the consequences were predictable. Chaos ruled supreme. The reinforcing infantry and tanks of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps clogged the crossing sites over the Vazuza as harried front and army staff officers tried in vain to clear the way for the advancing armor and cavalry of 6th Tank and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps. It was an impossible task. Although the rifle corps made it across the river, the tank and cavalry corps could not³¹. It was mid-day on 26 November before the 170 tanks of Colonel P. M. Arman's tank corps could go into action, and the mounted troopers of Major General V. V. Kriukov's 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps remained east of the river until 27 November. To Zhukov's and Konev's utter frustration, offensive momentum was already flagging. Furthermore, reinforcing forces had already suffered light casualties and was disorganized after the chaotic night march.

The defending Germans experienced the full impact of Kiriukhin's assault on 27 November. While German reserves from the 9th Panzer Division maneuvered into blocking positions along the open terrain either side of the critical Rzhev-Sychevka road, German front-line forces desperately, but skillfully defended their fortified village strong points, severely disrupting the attempted Soviet armored and cavalry exploitation. After noon Colonel Arman's 6th Tank Corps, attacking in brigade columns of about 50 tanks each with infantry riding on the tanks, lunged between and, in some cases, over the German strong point defenses, followed on horseback by the troopers of 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps. The German fortified village defenses atomized the Soviet attack into fragments. Nevertheless, three of Colonel Arman's brigades ran the gauntlet and crossed the vital Rzhev-Sychevka road, while one could not³². General Kriukov's more fragile cavalry suffered frightening losses as elements of three of his divisions raced through withering German fire across the road into the German rear, leaving the corps headquarters and logistical trains isolated in the small bridgehead far to the rear. The Germans responded by counterattacking from north and south along the Rzhev-Sychevka road against the exposed flanks of the exploiting Soviet forces³³. All the while, reinforced Soviet infantry struggled painfully to expand the bridgehead against undiminished German resistance.

A German eyewitness account captured the ferocity of the action, writing that the commander of the 78th Infantry Division's 215th Grenadier Regiment:

...was ordered to gather all of the units in the threatened sector into one combat group under his command, to close the gap, and, while ignoring the enemy who had already broken through, to prevent further breakthroughs. In his sector, [he] was able to assemble around him, in a blocking position at Lopotok, the division training company and whatever assault guns and stragglers were available. As he was organizing them, about five cossack squadrons galloped down upon them, trying to break out to the southeast. Everyone who had a weapon, whether infantryman, artilleryman, and even the assault guns and a light battery, engaged them in direct fire. By chance, a Ju-88 was circling over the village, discovered the Russians, and joined in battle with its bombs and on-board weapons. All of the cossacks were killed by this conglomerate of fire...After this episode...he formed three sectors out of splinter groups and stragglers and actually succeeded in closing the gap and repulsing all attacks³⁴.

A Soviet account laconically confirmed the terrible carnage:

The commander of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps was not able to assign his divisions' penetration missions in timely fashion on 28 November and did not provide for their timely commitment into combat. Having received its mission in timely fashion and, while operating skillfully and decisively, two regiments of the 20th Cavalry Division successfully penetrated between enemy strong points , but, having been cut off from the main force, the third regiment was unsuccessful and suffered heavy losses.

Having received its penetration order two hours after the 20th Cavalry Division, the 3rd Guards Cavalry Division attacked an already prepared and alerted enemy, fell under his concentrated cross-fire, and suffered heavy losses, including almost all of its artillery and the entire 10th Guards Cavalry Regiment³⁵.

In two days of fierce fighting, the 5th Panzer Division had suffered over 500 casualties, and the 78th Infantry Division reported, "All units severely weakened and great losses in equipment and weapons."³⁶ The cost to the Russians was obviously higher, for the Germans counted at least 50 destroyed Russian tanks, and the snow-covered fields in front of their positions were littered with brown-and white-clad Russian dead.

By nightfall on 28 November, it was clear to all that the Soviet attack had faltered. Although the bulk of Colonel Arman's tank corps and three of General Kriukov's cavalry divisions had reached the forests across the Rzhev-Sychevka road, the attrition in armor and cavalry had been staggering, and German counterattacks along the Rzhev road had slammed the door on their withdrawal. Worse still, the exploiting tankers and cavalrymen were no longer within the range of supporting artillery, since there was no room for it in the bridgehead³⁷. Zhukov and Konev, however, remained undeterred. They ordered their beleaguered tankers to organize a breakout to the west during the night of 28-29 November, while exhorting their forces in the bridgehead both to support the breakout and widen the breech in German lines. Zhukov's continued grim optimism was conditioned, in part, by his stubborn refusal to admit defeat and by the striking success Soviet forces seemed to be achieving to the west.

There, in the Belyi and Luchesa River sectors along the western flank of the Rzhev salient, Major General F.G.Tarasov's 41st and Major General V.A.Iushkevich's 22nd Armies had made striking progress in the first three days of battle and appeared close to reaching deep into the defending Germans' rear area. Once they had done so, thought Zhukov, the temporary difficulties along the Vazuza River would become irrelevant.

The 90,000 men and over 300 tanks of General Tarasov's 41st Army struck at 0900 hours on 25 November after an artillery preparation had smashed German forward defenses south of the fortified town of Belyi³⁸. Advancing in a driving snowstorm across the frozen, forested, and snow-covered swamps into the more open terrain along the main Belyi-Dukhovshchina dirt road which traversed the western flank of the salient, the riflemen of Major General I. I. Popov's 6th Stalin Volunteer Rifle Corps, supported by tank detachments from General M. D. Solomatin's 1st Mechanized Corps, easily overcame forward German defenses and lunged into the villages along the road and Vishenka River in the German tactical rear area³⁹. Heartened by the first day's successes, at dawn the next day, General Tarasov ordered his entire mechanized corps into action. Marching in brigade column with his 65th and 219th Tank Brigades in the lead, the 15,200 man and 224 tank-strong 1st Mechanized Corps, commanded by the experienced General M. A. Solomatin, made spectacular initial progress⁴⁰. Moving painfully through the heavy and virtually roadless forests, by nightfall General Solomatin's tank force had torn a hole 20 kilometers wide and nearly 30 kilometers deep in the German defenses. His lead brigades proudly announced their arrival along the Belyi-Vladimirskoe road astride vital German communications routes into Belyi⁴¹.

Solomatin later described the difficult advance, writing:

There were no roads, which would permit free movement of transport vehicles. The enemy had destroyed all bridges during his withdrawal. The deep snow cover and poor visibility in the falling snow strongly inhibited movement. The corps had no special vehicles for clearing snowdrifts and constructing column routes. We employed T-34 tanks for that purpose. They traveled in echelon, one after the other, so as to blaze a trail for the infantry vehicles and the towed artillery. In some instances motorised infantry followed the tanks on foot, which exhausted them and limited any form of combat maneuver.

The absence of roads, the dense forest, and the poor visibility in snowfall made orientation on the ground difficult. The tank sub-units, especially those in the in the lead, collided with one another. Advancing units often found themselves on the routes of their neighbor, which made it exceedingly difficult to control the force and slowed the rate of advance⁴².

Despite the difficulty encountered in keeping some sort of order during the advance through the forest depths, Solomatin's tank brigades succeeded in reaching the key communications road linking Belyi with the German rear area.

The German XXXXI Panzer Corps intelligence report that evening recognized the gravity of the situation, accurately noting:

The Red Army... broke through in the sector of the 352nd Grenadier Regiment...on a front of 15-20 kilometers wide and to a depth of 30-40 kilometers. The first assault wave consisted of 22 Red infantry battalions, supported by up to 100 T-34 tanks. About 24 infantry battalions followed, supported by another 200 tanks to enlarge the breakthrough to the east and to tie up German forces on the autobahn⁴³.

The further news that "another 20 Red battalions and 100 tanks were attacking further north in the Lushesa valley," prompted a German commander to note that, "The situation in the Szytschewka-Rzhew-Belyi area was exciting enough."⁴⁴

Despite General Solomatin's seemingly dramatic success, the attack plans of General Tarasov's 41st Army almost immediately went awry. Although ordered to avoid a prolonged struggle for the city of Belyi, Tarasov was inexorably drawn to the enticing target. The success of the initial Soviet assault seemed to indicate that Belyi was available for the taking⁴⁵. Drawn like a magnet to the city, Tarasov first committed Colonel N. O. Gruz's 150th Rifle Division against the city's southern defenses, and, when they did not prevail, he reinforced Gruz's division with a mechanized brigade from Solomatin's exploiting mechanized corps⁴⁶. Despite Tarasov's exertions and fierce fighting on the southern approaches to the city, Belyi could not be taken.

The credit for defending Belyi belonged to the commander of German XXXXI Panzer Corps, Colonel General Joseph Harpe, who decided to hold the city and relied on fate, luck, and anticipated German operational reserves to save the situation in the German rear⁴⁷. Harpe directed the infantry of his 246th Infantry Division to establish a strong point defense south of the city. He then requested and received a kampfgruppe each from Panzer Grenadier Division Grossdeutschland and 1st Panzer Division, which were located in reserve positions northeast and southwest of Belyi, respectively. Racing forward across the frozen snow-covered roads, 1st Panzer Division's Kampfgruppe von Weitersheim reached Belyi on late morning of 26 November, and Grossdeutschland Division's Kampfgruppe Kassnitz arrived several hours later⁴⁸. Together, the two groups began a bloody, but successful struggle to hold the city.

Meanwhile, an increasingly frustrated General Solomatin attempted to sever the crucial Belyi-Vladimirskoe road running northwest into Belyi, which was the only available German re-supply route into the city⁴⁹. Now opposed by company and battalion combat groups from 1st Panzer Division, which were deployed along and forward of the critical supply artery, Solomatin urgently asked Tarasov to reinforce his flagging attack with two mechanized brigades in army reserve⁵⁰. However, after demurring for a day, on 28 November Tarasov denied Solomatin's request and instead committed his two reserve brigades to the battle for Belyi. Colonel I. F. Dremov's fresh 47th Mechanized Brigade attacked northward east of Belyi in yet another attempt to envelop the city. Although Dremov's brigade severed the Belyi-Vladimirovka road, it ended up unsupported in an exposed position northeast of the city⁵¹. All the while, Solomatin's overextended mechanized force fought a bitter day-long struggle along a 30 kilometer sector of the key Belyi-Vladimirovskoe road. Solomatin's frustration increased when, on 29 November, his forward forces announced the arrival of fresh German armored reserves. Solomatin then knew what Tarasov did not. The fortunes of battle were clearly turning, and initial Soviet success had been squandered in the futile battle for Belyi. Consequently, Solomatin consolidated his positions, went over to the defense, and awaited the German counterstroke, which he knew was inevitable.

Solomatin was correct. The fresh German forces were the advanced elements of a force, which General Harpe was frantically assembling to contain and, ultimately, defeat the Soviet offensive. Relying on 1st Panzer Division to hold the Belyi strong point and the thin defenses along the Belyi-Vladimirskoe road, Harpe requested all available reserves from higher headquarters. General Alfred Model, the Ninth Army commander, and Field Marshal Guenther von Kluge, the Army Group Center commander, responded quickly by ordering the 12th, 20th, and 19th Panzer Divisions to march to the sound of the guns. To reach the battlefield, however, these divisions had to march long distances over difficult routes in the harshest of winter conditions. Until they arrived, both XXXXI Panzer Corps and Ninth Army's fate hung in the balance.

Model at Ninth Army had other worries. Although the situation along the Vazuza River seemed to be under control, further north his front lines along the Luchesa River had been breached, and his defensive positions along the Molodoi Tud River were under assault and seriously sagging. German headquarters across the front were also transfixed by the great battle playing out around Stalingrad. The knowledge that all was not well at Stalingrad lent urgency to their grim task⁵².

Model's growing concern was justified. Early on 25 November, General Iushkevich's 22nd Army, with over 50,000 men and 270 tanks of Major General M. E. Katukov's 3rd Mechanized Corps, assaulted eastward up the Luchesa River valley. Attacking along a narrow corridor flanked by forests and frozen swamps, Soviet forces tore a gaping hole through German defenses and drove German forces eastward up the valley. General Iushkevich's attack was spearheaded by Colonel I. V. Karpov's 238th Rifle Division and two regiments of Colonel M. F. Andriushenko's 185th Rifle Division, supported by a tank brigade of General Katukov's mechanized corps. The combined force routed a regiment of the German 86th Infantry Division and punctured the German front at the junction of the XXXXI Panzer Corps' 86th Infantry and the XXIII Army Corps' 110th Infantry Division. During the next two days Iushkevich committed Katukov's full corps and drove German forces further up the valley.

The German XXIII Army Corps responded by committing Grossdeutschland Division's Grenadier Regiment into the fray to slow the Soviet advance⁵³. Heavy fighting raged for possession of the key village of Starukhi as Soviet forces drove inexorably toward the Olenino-Belyi road in an attempt to support 41st Army's advance further south. Although the Germans were unable to close the yawning gap created by 22nd Army's attack, the often impenetrable terrain, deteriorating weather, and skillful German defense took a heavy toll on the advancing Soviets and halted them short of their goal. By 30 November the Soviets occupied a salient 8 kilometers wide and almost 15 kilometers deep in the German defenses. But, try as they did, Iushkevich's army could not overcome German resistance and reach the key Olenino-Belyi road⁵⁴.

A German participant later recorded the ferocity of the fighting, stating, "It was indescribable, what the infantrymen, engineers, the artillerymen, and the forward observers had to endure in the snow and ice of the forward combat line. Alert units had to be formed from convoy and supply units to close some of the developing gaps."⁵⁵ Another remarked, "There were attacks everywhere!. Crises rose by the hours!."⁵⁶ Nevertheless, the German defenses bent but did not break.

The tense situation along the Luchesa River was only exacerbated by unrelenting Soviet pressure against the northern extremity of the German Rzhev salient. There, on a broad front along the Molodoi Tud River, on 25 November the 80,000 men and over 200 tanks of Major General A. I. Zygin's Soviet 39th Army launched Zhukov's secondary attack with three rifle divisions and several rifle brigades, supported by two tank brigades and three separate tank regiments⁵⁷. Since Zygin's attack was intended to be secondary, he was unable to exploit several opportunities for success, which arose on the first day of combat⁵⁸. Although Soviet forces achieved some initial success in the snow-covered, rolling, and partially wooded countryside, they were unable to exploit it because of skillful action by German tactical reserves from the 14th Motorised Division and the Grossdeutschland Division's Grenadier Regiment.

By 30 November this struggle too had degenerated into a series of grinding Soviet attacks, which achieved only limited gains. The German XXIII Army Corps' defending 206th Infantry and 14th Motorised Divisions were forced to conduct some tactical withdrawals but, nevertheless, maintained a continuous defense line, which denied General Zygin's forces access to their objective, the Olenino-Rzhev road and rail line.

Zhukov, Konev, and Purkaev alternated between elation and frustration over the results of the first five days of operations. The Western Front's main attack in the Sychevka sector had clearly faltered. Although 20th Army's infantry had secured a foothold over the Vazuza River and its mobile forces occupied precarious positions astride the critical Rzhev-Sychevka road, the 31st Army's attack had utterly failed, and the 29th Army had not yet joined the assault. Nevertheless, both the 41st and 22nd Armies had made significant gains, and Konev still had significant reserves, including the almost 200 tanks of the 5th Tank Corps , which he could commit in the 20th Army's sector. Consequently, on Zhukov's instructions Konev reinforced the 20th Army with the 31st Army reserves divisions and ordered Kiriukhin to withdraw his exploiting armor and cavalry from their exposed position west of the Rzhev-Sychevka road. After regrouping, Kiriukhin was to continue his assault. Meanwhile, General Purkaev's two Kalinin Front armies west of the Rzhev salient would develop their attacks in support of the 20th Army. What Zhukov did not know was that the German command was preparing to strike back in the very sector where Zhukov's forces had achieved their greatest success.