PRELUDE TO KURSK: Soviet Strategic Operations February-March 1943 |
Military historians have long credited German Field Marshal Eric von Manstein with staving off disaster on the German Eastern Front in the winter of 1943, when the Red Army was exploiting its unprecedented victory at Stalingrad. To do so, von Manstein had to overcome two seemingly insurmountable obstacles. The first was an obstinate Hitler who, failing to comprehend the magnitude of the Stalingrad catastrophe, refused to permit his generals to conduct a maneuver defense. The second was a Red Army, which, inspired by their Stalingrad victory, was poised to exploit that victory by attacking incessantly everywhere. Von Manstein mastered both obstacles, inflicted a stunning defeat on the advancing Soviet host and temporarily restored stability to the southern wing of the Germans’ Eastern Front.
History has fairly assessed that von Manstein’s feat was indeed remarkable and probably thwarted ambitious Soviet plans for achieving spectacular victory in southern Russia. New archival evidence, however, now indicates that von Manstein’s victory was far more important than previously believed. The evidence indicates that von Manstein’s victories in the Donets Basin (Donbass) and around Kharkov were far more significant than historians have previously supposed. This is so because Soviet strategic aims in the winter of 1943 went far beyond the defeat of German forces in southern Russia. Instead, the Soviet High Command (Stavka) sought nothing less than the complete collapse of German defenses across the entire Eastern Front.
A multitude of sound histories document Soviet strategic intentions in the winter of
History has recorded that, in February 1943, increasingly threadbare Soviet forces, operating at the end of overextended logistical umbilicals, advanced with abandon into a trap set by von Manstein. Having obtained Hitler’s reluctant permission to resort to a maneuver defense, von Manstein then struck back. Skillfully regrouping and maneuvering his forces (in particular, his First and Fourth Panzer Armies and the newly arrived SS Panzer Corps), he launched twin brilliant counterstrokes. From 20 February through early March 1943, his forces smashed the overextended Soviet Southwestern Front and drove its remnants back to the Northern Donets River. Subsequently, from 6 through 23 March, von Manstein’s panzer corps struck the Voronezh Front’s overextended armies south of Kharkov. The furious attack collapsed the Soviet front, propelled German forces to Belgorod, and compelled the Stavka to abandon its ambitious winter campaign. The defeated and chastened Soviet forces erected hasty defenses along the Northern Donets River and along what would become the south face of the famous Kursk Bulge.
While historians have since argued over whether von Manstein’s forces could have done more in March 1943, they agree that this sequence of events set the stage, geographically and strategically, for the ensuing famous Battle of Kursk.
Already, some aspects of this conventional interpretation of the Soviet Winter Campaign require fundamental reassessment. For example, we now know that German relief efforts at Stalingrad were futile, since Paulus’s force had limited capabilities for breaking out and Soviet strategic deployments (principally of the 2d Guards Army) rendered breakout and linkup exceedingly unlikely. We also know that, in early December 1942, the Soviet High Command was already formulating plans to smash large elements of Army Group “B”, seize Rostov, and isolate and destroy Army Group “A” (in Operation Saturn). However, Soviet miscalculation of German strength at Stalingrad forced alteration of this plan. We also now know that Soviet overconfidence and outright ineptitude, in particular regarding the interpretation of intelligence information, and not just Soviet force weakness conditioned von Manstein’s victories in the Donbass in February and March. Finally, we know that Marshal Zhukov, exultant over the success of the Soviet offensives, added Kursk to the list of Soviet objectives in late January.
Hence, historians have concluded that Soviet strategic planning throughout the winter of 1943 focused on the southwestern axis, the strategic line extending from the Don River north of Stalingrad through Kharkov and Voroshilovgrad to the Dnieper River and Sea of Azov. The campaign’s aim, they believe, was the total destruction of German Army Groups “A”, Don, and the southern wing of Army Group “B.” This interpretation, however, ignores a second Soviet strategic axis that became equally important as the winter campaign developed. This new strategic axis extended from Voronezh through Kursk to Bryansk and beyond. Soviet military historians have written much about Soviet operations along this axis in January 1943. They have described in detail the
German archival data and fragmentary accounts found in Soviet memoirs and unit histories have long indicated the increased importance of this strategic axis. Now newly released Soviet archival materials indeed reveal the vast scope of Soviet strategic ambitions in their Winter Campaign. In short, they sought nothing less than the defeat of German Army Group Center. In February 1943 the Stavka formulated and attempted to carry out strategic plans, which, if realized, would have torn German defenses in the East in two and hastened the collapse of the entire German Eastern Front. The fact that these planned Soviet offensives did not succeed elevates the significance of von Manstein’s successful counterstrokes to strategic proportions, specifically, to the stature of a strategic counteroffensive.
In terms of its overall objectives, the Stavka’s strategic planning from spring 1942 through February 1943 was remarkably consistent. Long convinced of the vital importance of the Moscow axis, the Stavka concentrated its most powerful forces in that region in the spring of 1942. While accepting defense on the Moscow axis, Stalin impatiently attempted to regain the strategic initiative by conducting preemptive offensives at Kharkov and in the Crimea in May 1942. Both operations, however, ended in stark disaster. The subsequent German onslaught in southern Russia, which began on 28 June, surprised the Stavka but did not negate Soviet faith in the decisive importance of the Moscow axis. Henceforth, while the Stavka sought to halt and defeat German Army Group South (soon named “A” and “B”), it also contemplated future offensive action along the Moscow axis.
In early July 1942, the Stavka launched the first of many attempts to halt the German juggernaut. In early July its new 5th Tank Army struck German forces advancing toward Voronezh on the Don River, but the attack failed. Late in the same month, the Stavka struck again with a coordinated attack by its reinforced 5th Tank Army west of Voronezh and its 1st and 4th Tank Armies in the great bend of the Don River along the distant approaches to Stalingrad. These attacks also failed, although at greater cost to the advancing Germans. Beginning in early August, the Stavka ordered a series of lesser counterattacks designed to halt the German advance and stabilize the front on the immediate approaches to Stalingrad3. While these Soviet counterstrokes unfolded in the south, the forces of Marshal Zhukov’s Western Direction launched counterstrokes against the Army Group Center’s defenses in the Rzhev salient
German offensive momentum in the south was ebbing by late September 1942. Its forces were spread deeply into the Caucasus region, while the bulk of its powerful Sixth and Fourth Panzer Armies were locked in costly street fighting for the city of Stalingrad. Of necessity, the Germans deployed armies of its allies (Rumanians, Hungarians, and Italians) to defend their
The Soviets launched operation URANUS on 19 November 1942. Within days Soviet optimism soared as their forces linked up near
The Soviets conducted operation LITTLE SATURN from
Exploiting the success of the LITTLE SATURN and Kotel’nikovo operations, in early January the Stavka planned a new series of offensives. This time its targets were Hungarian and German forces defending northward along the Don River and the remnants of German and Rumanian forces now clinging desperately to the land bridge east of Rostov, through which Army Group “A” would have to pass to reach the safety of German lines. The Voronezh Front conducted the first of these new offensives, the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh’ operation, from
Even before the Voronezh-Kastornoe operation commenced, the Stavka was planning to expand the strategic offensive’s scope. While Soviet forces were advancing westward along the Voronezh and Rostov axes, on 20 and 23 January, the Stavka ordered the Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts to conduct two new operations
The preparations for operations STAR and GALLOP established a new planning pattern for the Winter Campaign. Given the severe time constraints and the extremely fluid situation, the Stavka formulated its new operational plans from the march while current operations were being prepared or conducted. True to this pattern and because of the spectacular successes achieved by Soviet forces around Voronezh, on 26 January the Stavka added Kursk to the list of objectives to be captured in operation STAR.
At least initially, the twin operations developed spectacularly. By 6 February Soviet forces had created huge gaps in the Germans’ defenses north and south of Kursk and between Kharkov and Slavyansk and were approaching Kursk, Belgorod, Kharkov, Slavyansk, and Voroshilovgrad. Although both German First and Fourth Panzer Armies had escaped to Rostov, thus avoiding entrapment in the Caucasus, now Rostov too was threatened and soon abandoned6. It seemed to the Stavka that the German position around Kursk and Kharkov and in the Donbass would become untenable if Soviet forces could accelerate their offensive actions. More important still, it seemed as if the entire German defense in southern Russia was in jeopardy of collapse. If this was so, then German Army Group Center’s southern flank was also vulnerable. Given the damage Soviet forces had already inflicted on that army group during their failed MARS offensive in the fall, there was every reason to be optimistic about prospects for expanding the Winter campaign to encompass operations against Army Group Center.
At this juncture and for these reasons, the Stavka revived its strategic hopes that had been dashed by the Germans, first in the winter of
Central to Soviet strategic planning in early February 1943 was the fact that the German Stalingrad garrison had surrendered on 2 February. This released to Stavka control six
The central feature of the Stavka’s expanded culminating stage of the Winter Campaign was a
Obviously, General Rokossovsky’s new Central Front would play a vital role in realization of this offensive’s ambitious goals. Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, then Deputy Chief of the General Staff, recalled:
While discussing the situation in the south and reckoning that the complete defeat of the Paulus’ grouping was merely a matter of days, the Stavka of the Supreme High Command was thinking about the subsequent use of the Don Front’s forces, which were being freed up from Stalingrad. After numerous conversations between the Supreme Commander and leading figures at the Center and in the fronts, yet another decision had matured at the end of January and beginning of February: besides the operations in the south, to conduct a series of
Accordingly, the Stavka issued the following order to Rokossovsky, the commander of the Don Front, on 5 February 1943:
1. Form the Central Front by 15 February 1943.
2. Rename the field headquarters of the Don Front the field headquarters of the Central Front. The front’s headquarters is to be located in the Ol’shanets region, 10 kilometers east of Elets.
3. Appoint Colonel General K. K. Rokossovsky to command the Central Front, Major General K. F. Telegin as the member of the front’s Military Council, and Lieutenant General M. S. Malinin as the chief of staff.
4. Include the field headquarters of the 21st, 65th, and 70th Armies, 16th Air Army, 2d Tank Army, 2d Guards Cavalry Corps, and divisions… in the Central Front.
5. …
6. Leave your deputy commander, Lieutenant General K. P. Trubnikov, with a group of commanders in the Stalingrad region.
I. Stalin
G. Zhukov9
On 6 February the Stavka issued directives to the Western, Bryansk, and Central Fronts containing the fronts’ specific missions for each phase of the forthcoming operation10. The directive to the Western Front ordered Colonel General I. S. Konev to transfer Lieutenant General P. A. Belov’s 61st Army on the front’s left flank to Bryansk Front control. Then, together with the Bryansk Front’s 61st Army, the Western Front’s 16th Army and 9th Tank Corps were attack on 12 February through Zhizdra toward Bryansk. The combined force was to link up with the Bryansk Front’s 13th and 48th Armies near the city of Bryansk, thus encircling the entire German Orel grouping. In addition, the directive ordered Konev to prepare an attack on 25 February with his 50th and 10th Armies and two tank corps toward Roslavl’ and Elnya in concert with the Bryansk and Central Fronts’ expanding offensive.
The Stavka directive to the Bryansk Front ordered Colonel General M. A. Reiter’s forces to cooperate with the Western Front in the rapid encirclement and elimination of the German
Rokossovsky received detailed instructions from the Stavka on the night of 6 February. They read:
For the purpose of further exploiting the Bryansk and Voronezh Fronts’ success and reaching the rear area of the enemy’s
By 12.2.43 concentrate:
a) The 2d Tank Army in the Dolgoe region;
b) The 2d Guards Cavalry Corps with three ski brigades and two tank regiments in the Cheremisinovo region;
c) The 65th Army in the region north of Dolgoe and south of Livny.
Move the 2d Tank Army, the 65th Army, and the 2d Cavalry Corps out of their concentration region to the Kursk and Fatezh deployment line by the end of 14. 2. 43.
Concentrate the remaining units of the 21st and 70th Armies in the Volovo, Dolgorukovo, and Livny regions as they arrive and send them after the advancing forces of the front’s first echelon.
The 2d Tank Army, 65th Army, and 16th Air Army will launch an offensive in the general direction of Sevsk and Unecha Station on the morning of 15. 2. 43 with the immediate mission of severing the
Deploy Kruikov’s
Bear in mind that the Bryansk Front’s 13th Army will advance to Bryansk on your right, and the Western Front’s 16th Army will launch an offensive through Zhizdra to Bryansk.
When your front’s armies have reached the
Simultaneously with your forces launching the offensive against Smolensk from the
The front’s boundary lines will be provided later. Bear in mind that the Voronezh Front’s 60th Army will be attacking on your front’s left in the general direction of Lgov, Glukhov, and Chernigov.
Stavka of the Supreme High Command
I. Stalin
G. Zhukov11
To plan such an operation was one thing. To carry it out was an altogether different matter, even if the Germans and circumstances permitted continued Soviet offensive progress in the south. Rokossovsky had to complete the concentration of his shock force in the Livny area within 6 days to meet the Stavka’s schedule, and the offensive itself was to commence in only 11 days. Although the 2d Tank Army and 2d Guards Cavalry Corps had already concentrated in the Livny region, the 70th Army’s forces had to move over 200 kilometers by road from the Elets region, and the 65th and 21st Armies had to complete their arduous railroad and road movement from Stalingrad. Heavy spring snows hampered all movement, the spring thaw [rasputitsa] was due to begin any day, and the roads from Livny and Elets to
Although he objected to the stringent time requirements imposed by the Stavka, nevertheless Rokossovsky moved to Elets with his staff, leaving his deputy, Lieutenant General K. P. Trubnikov, in Stalingrad to facilitate further troop movements northward. At Elets, Rokossovsky coordinated with General Reiter, the Bryansk Front’s commander, and set up his own front command post. He later described the awesome task confronting his staff as the sought to meet the Stavka’s offensive timetable:
From the outset we encountered tremendous difficulties. There was only one
Rokossovsky’s deployment problems were insurmountable. As a result, the Stavka had no choice but to delay the start of Central Front’s offensive from 15 to 25 February. Accordingly, the Kalinin and Western Fronts also postponed their offensives until late February or early March. Since the Central Front’s forces were unable to concentrate in the requisite time, the Stavka ordered the Bryansk and Voronezh Fronts to continue their exploitation with the forces of their 13th, 60th, and 48th Armies, while Rokossovsky completed his concentration and offensive preparations. The Bryansk Front’s armies and the Voronezh Front’s right wing proceeded to operate in accordance with the original plan, based on the assumption that their continued operations would only improve the situation for the Central Front when it finally launched its offensive. Lieutenant General N. P. Pukhov’s 13th Army seized Fatezh on 8 February, drove German Second Panzer Army’s forces to the outskirts of Maloarkhangelsk on 13 February, and threatened to envelop the German army’s right flank near Trosna with a special 13th Army operational group commanded by Lieutenant General Novosel’sky. By 23 February Pukhov’s lead division (the 132d Rifle Division) was struggling on the approaches to
Meanwhile, on the Voronezh Front’s left flank, Lieutenant General I. D. Cherniakhovsky’s 60th Army drove German Second Army’s 4th Panzer Division from Kursk on 8 February. Together, the 60th and 13th Armies opened a wide 60-kilometer gap between the German Second Panzer and Second Armies -- a breach Rokossovsky’s Central Front was expected to exploit14. While Rokossovsky prepared his forces for the offensive, the Voronezh Front ordered Cherniakhovsky’s army to capture Lgov by 15 February and Rylsk by 17 February so as to solidify Soviet positions along the southern flank of Rokossovsky’s intended penetration15. Without regrouping or reorganizing, Cherniakhovsky’s forces advanced westward from Kursk, but were halted on 20 February on the approaches to Lgov. Unable to penetrate into Lgov, Cherniakhovsky dispatched his 248th Student Rifle Brigade to the west with orders to ensure that the gap between the two German armies remains open
Meanwhile Rokossovsky’s lead armies, the 65th and 2d Tank Armies, raced to complete their deployment forward from Elets and Livny to Fatezh. Lieutenant General P. I. Batov moved his headquarters to Elets on 18 February to supervise the forward deployment of 65th Army, and his divisions began reaching their assigned concentration areas north of Fatezh by 24 February. Of necessity, Batov’s attack on 25 February would occur literally from the march. Lieutenant General A. G. Rodin’s 2d Tank Army had the daunting task of moving his tank army (with its 408 tanks)
Rokossovsky commenced his offensive as ordered on the morning of 25 February. Since Major General G. F. Tarasov’s 70th and Lieutenant General I. M. Chistiakov’s 21st Army were still on the move, they were ordered to join the attack as soon as they arrived in the region, even before their full concentration. Meanwhile, the Bryansk Front’s 13th and 48th Armies continued pounding the German Second Panzer Army’s weakened right flank, and on 22 February Lieutenant General I. H. Bagramian’s 16th Army of the Western Front struck German Second Panzer Army’s left flank north of Zhizdra. Despite the massive attack, rainy weather and a skillful German defense kept Bagramian’s forward progress to a minimum. At a cost of huge losses, his army advanced only 7 kilometers by 25 February. Because of the intense fighting and only limited gains, Colonel General I. S. Konev, the Western Front commander, denied Bagramyan permission to commit his 9th Tank Corps to complete the penetration. Bagramyan later bitterly lamented this decision and criticized Konev and his successor, Colonel General V. D. Sokolovsky, for their failure to adequately support the attack18. Nonetheless, Bagramyan had no choice but to continue his costly futile assaults is support of Rokossovsky’s offensive. Colonel General M. A. Belov’s 61st Army launched attacks north and east of Bolkhov in support of Bagramian’s effort, but these attacks too faltered after Soviet forces seized a small bridgehead on the west bank of the Oka River19.
Further north, the Western Front’s 5th Army attacked German defenses east of Gzhatsk on 22 February, and, simultaneously, the 33d Army’s forces struck at German defenses east of Vyazma20. However, there was very little hope that these attacks against strong and tested German defenses would do more than simply distract the Germans from the more important events taking place to the south. While the German’s defenses around the
By the time Rokossovsky’s forces launched their offensive, there were already ominous signs that the overall Soviet strategic offensive was encountering unanticipated difficulties. Contrary to Stavka expectations, the frenetic and poorly coordinated Southwestern Front offensive faltered by
After skillfully reorganizing his forces to bring the full force of his First and Fourth Panzer Armies and his newly arrived SS Panzer Corps to bear, von Manstein, the commander of German Army Group South, struck back at overextended Soviet forces. Attacking on 20 February, von Manstein’s XXXX Panzer Corps dismembered Mobile Group Popov in the Krasnoarmeiskaya region and chased its remnants back through Barvenkovo to the Northern Donets river22. Subsequently, the SS Panzer and XXXXVIII Panzer Corps inflicted a crushing defeat on the Southwestern Front’s overextended forces near Pavlograd and Lozovaya, destroyed the 25th Tank Corps and pushed the Soviet forces back to the Northern Donets River. At first the Stavka discounted the seriousness of the situation and steadfastly insisted that the German counteroffensive would expire or become irrelevant in light of Rokossovsky’s successes further north. The Stavka stubbornly refused to alter its plans, trusting that the Voronezh Front, whose forces were still advancing successfully south and west of Kharkov, could cope with the temporary setback in the Donbass. In essence, a deadly race ensued between Rokossovsky’s forces attacking toward Bryansk and von Manstein’s armored spearheads now approaching Kharkov from the south. At stake were Stavka strategic expectations and the fate of its Winter Campaign.
The two spearhead armies of Rokossovsky’s Central Front lunged into the gap between German Second Panzer and Second Armies on the morning of 25 February, two days after General Pukhov reported that his 13th Army’s had finally seized Maloarkhangelsk23. Covered by the 13th Army’s 132d Rifle Division and Group Novosel’sky, which were pressuring the German Second Panzer Army’s right flank, the advanced rifle divisions of Lieutenant General P. I. Batov’s 65th Army advanced towards Komarichi and Dmitriev-Orlovskiy in regimental column and against light enemy resistance. On the army’s right flank, the regiments of Colonel I. A. Kuzovkov’s 69th Rifle Division’s were deployed across a broad front and maintained only loose contact with the 13th Army’s operational group (separate ski brigades whose mission was to facilitate the 65th Army’s advance). In the 65th Army’s center and on its left flank, the 354th and 37th Guards Rifle Divisions advanced in similar fashion against weak resistance offered by elements of the German 137th Infantry Division24. At this juncture, the defending Germans sought only to monitor and slow Soviet forward progress until reinforcements arrived to establish a more solid defense. Batov’s dispersed attack formation could do no more than slowly press the defending Germans back. The 65th Army’s advance was also hindered by the delayed arrival of the 70th Army’s forces. Although the 70th Army had been assigned an offensive sector on the 65th Army’s right flank, the Batov’s forces had to cover the entire sector until troops from the 70th arrived. Finally, on 26 February an operational group from General Tarasov’s 70th Army reached the Gremiach’e area and began feeding the army’s divisions piecemeal into their respective offensive sectors25. For days, however, while the 65th Army pressed forward, the bulk of the 70th Army’s divisions continued struggling forward along the roads from Livny to Fatezh.
Deploying forward from concentration areas around Fatezh, General Rodin’s 2d Tank Army attacked westward on 25 February through a screen erected by the 13th Army’s 132d Rifle Division, which had driven forces from the German 707th Security Division back to the outskirts of
The tenacious German defense of
The Soviet Central Front’s offensive finally recorded some successes on 2 March, even though the attacks by the Bryansk Front’s 13th and 48th Armies had faltered at and north of Maloyaroslavets. On the Central Front’s right flank, Batov’s 65th Army carved a deep salient in the German defenses between Komarichi and Trosna on the flanks of German forces defending
Despite the progress on his left and right flank, the situation in Rokossovsky’s central sector was less encouraging. After abandoning
During the ensuing five days, Rokossovsky’s force made only grudging gains on his front’s right flank and in its center and spectacular but misleading progress on its left flank. On the right, Batov’s 65th Army was joined by an increasing flow of 70th Army divisions, which finally occupied their assigned front sector and struggled alongside the 65th Army’s divisions to penetrate the German 78th Infantry and 12th Panzer Divisions’ defenses protecting the southern approaches to Orel. Rokossovsky hounded the two army commanders to intensify their attacks. Tarasov’s 70th Army pounded German defenses west of Trosna unmercifully, but at high cost, and Batov’s forces pushed across the Usozha River and seized some villages on the approaches to Komarichi. However, progress in both sectors was agonizingly slow. It was becoming painfully apparent to all concerned that significant reinforcements were required to sustain any continued advance.
However, to the south and west, Rokossovsky’s force fared far better. Major General I. G. Lazarov’s 11th Tank Corps of Rodin’s 2d Tank Army captured Sevsk on 1 March and, rolling westward, seized the key road junctions at Seredina Buda and Suzemka on 4 March. Cooperating with partisan units, the corps’ 59th Tank Brigade swung north toward Igritskoe on the Usozha River in an attempt to find the Second Panzer Army’s open right flank. The 11th Tank Corps’ remaining brigades fanned out in support of General Kriukov’s
The most immediate source of reinforcements for Rokossovsky’s faltering offensive was Lieutenant General I. M. Chistiakov’s 21st Army, which had been en route to the Livny area from Stalingrad since early February29. The lead elements of Chistiakov’s army reached their assembly areas around Fatezh on 4 March. Rokossovsky avoided repeating the mistake he had made previously when he committed the 70th Army to combat piecemeal and ordered Chistyakov to assemble his army fully before committing it to action. Once committed, Chistiakov’s force was to reinforce the advance of Batov and Tarasov’s forces on Orel. Rokossovsky’s reinvigorated offensive, however, now faced new time imperatives imposed by events taking place well outside of his area of operations. In fact, these imperatives forced him to renew his attacks before Chistiakov’s army was ready to go into action.
The most serious of these new factors was the success von Manstein’s expanded counteractions achieved to the south. Between 1 and 5 March, von Manstein’s Fourth Panzer Army encircled and utterly destroyed the Soviet 3d Tank Army in heavy fighting south of Kharkov, and his SS Panzer and XXXXVIII Panzer Corps then threatened the Soviet Voronezh Front’s defenses protecting the key Ukrainian city. Finally appreciating the gravity of the situation, the Stavka reassigned its strategic reserves to restore the situation. These reserves included the 62d and 64th Armies, which were en route from Stalingrad and which had earlier been earmarked to reinforce Rokossovsky’s offensive. Even at this juncture, however, the Stavka demurred and refused to halt Rokossovsky’s offensive30. Instead, on 7 March they altered Rokossovsky’s mission. Rather than striking deeply at Bryansk and Smolensk, the Stavka ordered Rokossovsky to regroup his forces to the Orel axis and conduct a shallower envelopment of the German Orel Grouping in conjunction with operations by the Bryansk and Western Fronts.
Specifically, the Stavka ordered Rokossovsky to concentrate his forces along the Usozha River and attack northward through Lokot’ toward Orel with his 2d Tank, 65th, and 70th Armies deployed from left to right. Chistiakov’s 21st Army was to join the attack as soon as his army was fully concentrated and combat ready. Simultaneously, the Stavka ordered Bagramian’s 16th Army of the Western Front, which had already been locked in fruitless combat for over two weeks on the Zhizdra axis, to renew its attacks and provided adequate reinforcements for it to do so. The Bryansk Front’s 61st, 13th and 48th Armies were to launch supporting attacks along the entire circumference of the Orel salient. Finally, General Cherniakhovsky’s 60th Army was to seize Rylsk and continue its attack to Glukhov so as to protect Rokossovsky’s long left flank.
The Stavka’s intention to support Rokossovsky’s new offensive with
Just as the Germans were beginning their withdrawal from Rzhev, Rokossovsky set about fulfilling the Stavka’s new orders. He ordered Rodin to reassemble his tank army south of the Usozha River and to deliver a concentrated blow along the Lokot’ and Orel axis in concert with Batov’s 65th Army. Tarasov’s 70th Army was to cooperate with Pukhov’s 13th and Romanenko’s 48th Armies of the Bryansk Front and smash German defenses from west of Trosna to north of Maloyaroslavets. In turn, Rodin ordered General Lazarev’s 11th Tank Corps and the 115th Rifle Brigade to turn over their offensive sector west of Sevsk to General Kriukov’s
Although Rokossovsky’s began his new offensive on 7 March with heavy attacks by the 65th Army against German forces east of Komarichi, his offensive developed in piecemeal fashion, largely due to delays in assembling 2d Tank Army’s re-deploying 11th Tank Corps. Despite the 11th Tank Corps absence, Major General A. G. Maslov’s 16th Tank Corps and the 60th and 194th Rifle Divisions, attacking on the 65th Army’s left flank, drove German forces back to the Usozha River and, in desperate fighting, gained small footholds on the river’s north bank. Three days later on 10 March, the 11th Tank Corps brigades finally went into action and drove across the Usozha River southwest of Komarichi. By this time, the twin assaults by the 2d Tank and 65th Armies threatened to envelop German forces defending forward of Komarichi. However, Rokossovsky’s efforts were in vain, since the Second Panzer Army now committed fresh reserves (the 45th and 72d Infantry Divisions) into Rodin’s and Batov’s path. To the east, Tarasov, Pukhov’s, and Romanenko’s armies exhausted themselves in futile attacks on the German defenses east and west of Trosna. While the seesaw struggle continued unabated, once again events elsewhere frustrated Rokossovsky’s and the Stavka’s grand plans.
South of the Central Front’s large penetration, by 7 March the German Second Army had completed a major force regrouping by shifting forces northward from the Belopol’e and Sumy regions to assemble forces capable of closing the yawning gap between it and Second Panzer Army. While containing the advance of General Cherniakhovsky’s 60th Army on the immediate approaches to Rylsk, the Second Army assembled its 82d and 88th Infantry Divisions along the southern flank of General Kriukov’s
Rokossovsky heeded Kriukov’s calls for assistance and appreciated his dilemma. Unfortunately, there was little he could do. Once again, events were beyond his control. While his assaults had recorded limited progress, the supporting attack by Bagramian’s 16th Army north of Orel had failed miserably at immense human cost. Nor had any of the other supporting attacks achieved anything. Worse still, von Manstein’s German Army Group South had renewed its offensive with a vengeance, this time against the Voronezh Front’s overextended and exhausted armies defending south of Kharkov. To the apparent surprise of the Stavka, von Manstein’s SS Panzer Corps and Corps Raus (which included the powerful Grossdeutschland Division) struck directly at Soviet forces defending Kharkov on 6 March and seized the city on 15 March. Then on 17 March, the force struck northward toward Belgorod in concert with Second Army forces attacking from the west. Von Manstein’s assault tore apart the Voronezh Fronts 3d Tank and 69th Armies and threatened the latter and 40th Army with encirclement between Belgorod and Sumy. Any subsequent successful German advance would clearly also threaten the southern flank and rear of Rokossovsky’s entire Central Front. If the experiences of the Southwestern and Voronezh Fronts were an accurate indicator of German capabilities, the Central Front was now in jeopardy. For the first time in weeks, the Stavka now fully appreciated the deteriorating situation. The crisis was, indeed, real.
Spurred to action, the Stavka hastily began to assemble strategic reserves necessary to halt the German advance and to preserve as many of the precious gains made during the Winter Campaign as possible. Its first decision, reached on 11 March, was to transfer General Chistiakov’s 21st Army, which had just completed its concentration near Fatezh, from Central to Voronezh Front control. As Chistyakov hastily moved his army southward through Kursk to Oboyan’, Rokossovsky’s last hopes for inflicting defeat on the German Orel grouping disappeared. Reflecting its increased desperation, the Stavka also ordered the 1st Tank Army southward from the Staraya Russa region to Kursk to back up the Voronezh Front and the 24th and 66th Armies from Stalingrad to concentrate at Voronezh in the Voronezh Front’s deep rear31. The Stavka correctly believed that these forces, together with the 62d and 64th Armies, which had just arrived from Stalingrad, would be sufficient to bring von Manstein’s juggernaut to a halt. Ironically, bad weather and exhaustion were enough to halt the German drive. Von Manstein called a halt to his attacks on 17 March, shortly after his forces captured Belgorod. The fighting then subsided and the lines stabilized along the southern face of the famous Kursk Bulge.
Rokossovsky’s forces continued limited offensive operations until 21 March. During this period he shifted reserves to help General Kriukov extricate his beleaguered cavalry and rifle forces from the German pincers closing on Sevsk. Meanwhile the Stavka undertook frenetic efforts to reorganize its forces along the Kursk, Orel axis. On 12 March the Stavka abolished the Bryansk Front, assigning its 61st Army to the Western Front, its 3d, 48th, and 13th Armies to the Central Front, and its front headquarters and 15th Air Army to the Stavka reserve. A week later the Stavka ordered the creation, effective 23 March, of the new Kursk Front, commanded by Colonel General Reiter and consisting of the 60th, 38th, and 15th Air Armies32. The new Kursk Front’s task was to employ the 60th and 38th Armies, the Voronezh Front’s right wing armies that emerged relatively intact from the preceding operations, to defend the critical nose of the emerging Kursk Bulge. The Stavka promised to reinforce the front with two additional armies as soon as feasible, probably the regrouped 63d and 66th Armies.
Within days, however, the Stavka once again reorganized its forces for defense. First, on 27 March it abolished the Kursk Front, assigning the 38th Army to the Voronezh Front, which had now stabilized its positions along a line extending from Sudzha to Belgorod33. It assigned the 60th Army to Rokossovsky’s Central Front and ordered Rokossovsky to defend the Bryansk, Kursk and Orel, Kursk axes. At the same time, it formed a new Orel Front consisting of the 3d and 61st Armies supported by the 15th Air Army, tasked with protecting the nose of the German Orel salient. Finally on 29 March, it completed this round of hasty reorganizations by renaming the Orel Front the Bryansk Front.
The Winter Campaign was at an end. By the end of March, the Stavka’s hopes for significant additional strategic gains in spring 1943 had been dashed. The gaze of strategic planners on both sides would now be riveted on the legacy of the failed Soviet strategic offensive, the Kursk Bulge.
As had been the case a year before, in the winter of
Archival materials vividly underscore the problems the Red Army encountered during Rokossovsky’s failed offensive. First and foremost, the Stavka and field commands required Red Army soldiers, who were exhausted by months of near constant combat, to perform tasks far beyond their capabilities. The high losses and immense human suffering that resulted was predictable. The combat records of the 13th Army’s 15th Rifle Division serve as a gruesome example. The division participated in the Voronezh-Kastornoe operation, helped capture Maloyaroslavets in late February, and then fought for a month northwest of the town. From 13 January through 20 February 1943, the division suffered 683 men dead, 1,581 wounded, and 542 missing, or about 25 percent its original combat strength. Nor did its heavy losses cease. The division lost an additional 119 dead, 243 wounded, and 53 missing by 28 February in heavy fighting at and north of Maloyaroslavets. The division’s agony continued right up to the end of the operation, as typified by a division daily report dated 17 March that noted the loss of 28 men dead and 164 wounded35. The division finally went over to the defense on 20 March. The 15th Rifle division’s losses, which ultimately reached about 50 percent of its original personnel strength, were typical for most rifle division and brigades serving in the 48th, 65th, and 70th Armies.
The Central Front command was especially upset by the unnecessary and excessive losses by the 70th Army, particularly those that the division suffered during its attacks west of Trosna against the German 18th Panzer Division between 8 and 17 March. Central Front Decree #00116, dated 4 April, sharply criticized the army, stating:
The unsuccessful offensive operations by the 70th Army to seize and hold the Svetlyi Luch, Novaya Ialta, Rzhavchik, Muravchik, and height marker 260.2 region and the suffering of huge losses numbering 8,849 men and material in this operation is explained by: the unsatisfactory preparations for this operation on the part of the Military Council and, first and foremost, by Major General Comrade Tarasov, the army commander; the weak organizational role and unsatisfactory control on the part of the staff; and the perfunctory attitude of the formation and unit commanders to the organization of combat…
On 30 March 1943 the army was missing (in addition to the combat losses) 7,802 rifles, 2,145 heavy machine guns, 326 submachine guns, 556 PPSh, 20 45 mm guns, 44 82 mm mortars, 93 50 mm mortars, and 240 antitank rifles36.
The troops in the supporting armies fared little better. We have already cited the 138,577 casualties suffered by the Kalinin and Western Fronts during their pursuit of German forces from the
Overall, the Bryansk Front suffered 134, 903 casualties between 1 January and 12 March 1943, when the front was disbanded. These casualties included 37,423 men lost in the Voronezh-Kastornoe operation and almost 100,000 men lost during the
Given these heavy losses, the most vexing question was how the armies and divisions maintained any combat capability at all. The fact that they sustained the offensive as long as they did attests to the effectiveness of the Soviet personnel replacement system that ruthlessly refilled its armies’ rank with fresh levies from the newly liberated regions. For example, in late March the 60th Army’s 121st Rifle Division reported:
The division took part in the battles for Voronezh, Kursk, and Lgov. The division suffered heavy losses in the battles for the Lukashevka and Soldatskoe line due to the unskillful leadership of the former division commander, Bushin, for which the division commander was relieved from his duties. On 25 March 1943, the division had a strength of 7,025 men, of which 5,573 joined as replacements by means of a mobilization on the territory of Kursk region that was liberated from the German invaders42.
At roughly the same time, a status report by 60th Army’s 248th Student Rifle Brigade stated:
[The brigade] joined the 60th Army on 30 January 1943. It took part in the battles for Kursk and Lgov. The brigade operated especially skillfully and energetically during the Lgov operation. Dispatched far forward along the Nizhne Chupakhino and Konoprianovka line (along the western bank of the Svapa River) on the army’s flank, the brigade threatened Rylsk from the north and, by doing so, resolved the outcome of the operation for possession of Lgov. During that period U-2 aircraft supplied the brigade with ammunition and the division obtained its foodstuffs from local resources. The strength of the brigade on 25 March 1943 was 2,389 men, of which 774 joined as replacements by means of a mobilization conducted in the Kursk region, which was now liberated from the fascist invaders, and from the disbanded Drozdov Partisan Detachment43.
Although the brigade had lost about half of its combat strength, the report concluded, «The brigade is fully combat ready. Materials are being assembled for the awarding of a guards banner for [its] exemplary fulfillment of combat missions in the destruction of the German invaders while displaying good organization and firm discipline.»
Despite the effective forced levy for Red Army replacements, some reports indicated that the army’s blocking detachments, which were used to prevent desertions, were not always fully effective. For example, on 16 March the 13th Army issued specific orders to its three blocking detachments requiring that they remedy the problem. The order stated:
Replacements are joining the ranks of the Red Army from regions liberated from the enemy’s forces. In the struggle against possible instances of desertion and the avoidance of military service, THE ARMY COMMANDER ORDERS:
Strengthen the blocking duties of army blocking detachments;
Systematically conduct universal inspections of the entire male population in all population points;
Comb all forests and orchards thoroughly and examine all haystacks, uninhabited buildings, and especially dugouts situated along the lines of the old defenses;
Strengthen the inspection of documents of those passing through the populated points and suspicious persons.
Report on all implemented measures by 25 March 1943.
Major General Petrushevsky, the chief of staff of the 13th Army’s44
This draconian Soviet replacement system did not always improve unit discipline. For example, a report by the 121st Rifle Division, prepared on 12 March during the height of the 60th Army’s unsuccessful attempt to seize Rylsk, touched on the problem and provided a glimpse of a pettiness that masked real morale problems. In part, it stated:
The discipline of the [division’s] personnel fell precipitously during the period of offensive combat operations. The soldiers and commanders…no longer maintain their required military bearing…[they] neither tuck in [their boots] nor salute their seniors in rank. Consequently,
I ORDER: Organize one hour of military training daily for all personnel in all of the division’s units. In military training, first and foremost, work out [the troops] external appearance (the correct wearing of headgear, the tucking in of greatcoats, waist belts, equipment, leg-wrappings, etc.)…45
Given the length of the campaign, the high casualties, and the seemingly endless combat, it is quite understandable that the morale of officers and men alike began to flag. Among the many manifestations of this problem were the growing instances of drunkenness and self-mutilation among the troop and even the officers. This fact was recognized in a 31 March order of the 60th Army’s commander to his men. The report read:
Recently, many instances, which are inadmissible to Red Army soldiers and commanders, have been observed in the division’s units – including drinking binges, which have spread to a great degree among the command personnel. Instead of ceasing this unnecessary phenomenon, in some instances units and
The 121st Rifle Division commander Major General Ladygin
The 121st Rifle Division chief of staff Lieutenant Colonel Generalov46
A similar breakdown of discipline was noted in 65th Army Order #4 dated 25 March 1943, which read:
The presence of unstable elements that have carried out various crimes motivated by cowardice have appeared in our army’s units during the course of active military operations. Among these crimes, self-mutilation [self-inflicted wounds] is found to have been especially widespread. During the first half of March 1943, 22 men have been exposed and judged as self-mutilators in the 246th Rifle Division alone, of which the largest part appear in the 908th Rifle Regiment. Self-mutilation is the most widespread in the 37th Guards, 246th, and 354th Rifle Divisions…
Commander of the 65th ArmyMember of the Military Council
Lieutenant General BatovColonel Luchko
Chief of staff of the army Major General Glebov47
Archival records also extensively critiqued the conduct of the operation and provided
The experience of the initial battles indicates that a number of unit and
I ORDER:
All formation and units commanders in combat will lead stringently according to the Infantry Combat Regulations. There will be severe punishment for deviating from the Regulations during offensive operations.
Colonel General Reiter, commander of the Bryansk Front’s forces
Major General of Tank Forces Susaikov, member of the Bryansk Front’s Military Council
Major General Sandalov, chief of the Bryansk Front’s staff49
Sometimes orders seemed to be contradictory. For example, a day later on 4 February the same front criticized its 13th and 48th Armies for the reverse problems, stating:
The 13th, and in particular, the 48th Army’s offensive combat experiences indicate that the weak command and control of forces on the battlefield results primarily from the fact that division and even battalion commanders are directing the battle from warm peasant houses in populated points with the help of telephones… rather than from their command posts, from which they would be able to see the battle on the main axis.
I ORDER:
Division, regiment, and battalion commanders to direct battle exclusively from their command posts so that they can better see the field of battle on the main axis and respond to the situation in more timely fashion…
Inform the division, regiment, and battalion commanders of this directive without delay.
Colonel General Reiter, commander of the Bryansk Front’s forces
Major General Susaikov, member of the Bryansk Front’s Military Council
Major General Sandalov, chief of the Bryansk Front’s staff50
Other combat reports evidenced the decaying troop discipline during the operation and increased cases of looting. For example, a 1 February Bryansk Front order noted:
It has been determined that the chiefs of the armies’ rear services and the corps and division commanders do not immediately appoint garrison chiefs and commandants and do not establish required military order when occupying populated points liberated from the enemy. In light of this situation, railroad stations, public and state property, trophy property, and other material of value are not being protected at all, and property is being plundered.
I ORDER:
When occupying a populated point, the garrison chief and commandant will fulfill their responsibilities and establish revolutionary order without delay51.
Logistical support became an Achilles heel for advancing Soviet forces and one of the primary reasons for the failure of the offensive. Among the numerous documents identifying this problems was a Bryansk Front order issued on 6 February to all of its subordinate units, which stated in part:
Demand that rear service units be more agile in the supply of units with all necessities. Do not simply note the fact that foodstuffs, ammunition, and fuel are absent, but instead implement yourself all measures necessary to supply the units with all necessities and, by doing so, support the successful offensive battles.
Colonel General Reiter, commander of Bryansk Front forces
Major General Susaikov, member of the Bryansk Front’s Military Council
Major General Sandalov, Bryansk Front chief of staff52
Ten days later, a Bryansk Front directive, dated 17 February criticized the poor cooperation between tank and infantry forces and once again linked this recurring problem with associated persistent logistical difficulties. It declared:
The employment of the front’s tank forces during the recent combat period shows that a considerable number of tanks are not taking part in the battles because of insufficient fuel and ammunition. This has resulted from the snowdrifts and the considerable gap between the tank units and the armies’ forward supply bases. The
I ORDER:
The responsibility for combat support of the tanks is to be placed on the
Employ all types of transport, including the cart [horse] transport of the rifle divisions and regiments for the support of tank units with POL and ammunition54.
Sometimes, the congestion along the few and snowbound roads caused commanders to take the easy way out and place their headquarters together in convenient town and villages. This indiscretion created lucrative targets for the Germans and costly command casualties. Bryansk Front Order #4, dated 17 February documented one such case in the 48th Army during the fighting east of Maloyaroslavets, noting:
Contents: Concerning the inadmissibility of [having] a great number of formation and units staffs in a single populated point. The headquarters of the 137th Rifle Division, the headquarters of the 12th Artillery Division, and the headquarters of a guards mortar regiment gathered in the village of Markino on
I ORDER:
1. Do not permit the placement of several headquarters in a single populated point. Formation and unit commanders will place their headquarters in the offensive sector of their own formation/unit;
2. When placing headquarters and forces in a populated point, carefully conceal them from the air;
3. In all cases, the chiefs of staff will provide antiaircraft measures and organize the repulsion of enemy air raids with not only existing weaponry but also with infantry weapons (rifles, machine guns, antitank rifles, etc.).54
A 13th Army order to all of its formation, prepared on 2 March, a week after the army’s second major attack north of Maloarkhangelsk, catalogued some of the recurring command deficiencies in that army’s conduct of tactical combat, stating:
The offensive combat conducted by the army’s units revealed a number of deficiencies in the forces’ tactical operations.
The established requirement that battalion commanders be granted
The requirement for continuous reconnaissance was entirely forgotten.
The attack was carried out in disorganized fashion, there was no impetuosity and camouflage, and the charges [rushes] were excessively long…
The unit commanders often forgot to develop their
Recently, separate instances took place of nothing less than unwarranted withdrawals by separate
The enemy is very sensitive to night attacks and fears them; nevertheless, often the night attacks have no success. This can be explained by the absence of the element of surprise and the weak discipline of a night attack (clamor and noise).
There is insufficient employment of assault groups during combat for populated points and inadequate practice in direct firing from artillery weapons…
Infantry weapons and antitank rifles are seldom used to combat
The regulations require the elimination of all possible intervals between the end of the artillery preparation and the beginning of the attack.
Indeed, these requirements are not being observed. Often the infantry are late in launching the attack (such as the 148th Rifle Division), and the enemy regains his senses and meets the attackers with organized fires.
Commander of the 13th Army Member of the Military Council
Lieutenant General PukhovMajor General Kozlov
Chief of staff of the 13th Army
Major General Petrushevsky55
These problems persisted until the very end of the operation, contributing to the continuing high casualty rates. For example, a 13th Army’s order prepared on 21 March declared:
Of late, combat operations have been limited to only night reconnaissance raids by small number of scouts. However, force losses remain considerable despite the lull along the front. The army has lost 555 men, including 108 command personnel, and 59 horses during the period from 1 through 20 March 1943. The main reasons for this situation, which will be intolerable in the future, are the absence of required order in the forward edge of the defense, non-observation of elementary maskirovka [camouflage] measures, and the absence of a struggle against senseless losses in combat personnel.
Major General Petrushevksy, the chief of staff of the 13th Army
Colonel Grechikhin, the chief of the 13th Army’s operational department56
The Central Front’s records also cast considerable light on the employment of penal units and
An investigation has established the following facts regarding treachery to the Homeland that took place in the 13th, 70th, 65th, and 48th Armies:
…
Weak discipline and unsatisfactory organizational work in the training and education of the personnel in penal companies and battalions and a flagrant violation of NKO USSR Order #227 on the employment of penal
The front Military Council demands that:
…
Penal
Rokossovsky,
Telegin57
General Rokossovsky was even blunter in his criticism of his front’s operations, in particular about the dismal performance of General Tarasov’s 70th Army. He spelled out his complaints in an 18 March directive to his armies, a copy of which was sent to the Stavka along with his personal request that Tarasov be immediately relieved from command.
The harshness of Rokossovsky’s criticism was justified, for General Tarasov had long displayed his unfitness for command. Only months before, in
The vast amount of archival materials on the
Given the situation, however, the Stavka’s decision to expand the offensive was understandable and bold. The Red Army’s military successes in the south were striking and seemingly limitless. Numerous and powerful new armies were available after the surrender of the German Stalingrad group, and these new armies could be employed in a variety of ways. At the time, it seemed prudent to employ them to reinforce an already successful offensive against a German force subject to collapse at any moment. The alternative was to retain them for summer operations and, in the meantime, provide the German Army with the opportunity for restoring its defenses in southern Russia. The Soviets chose the former option. However, force and weather conditions forced the Stavka to employ its new strategic reserves piecemeal rather than en mass, and this limited their impact on the ensuing operations. When all is said and done, while the reserves were insufficient to guarantee greater strategic victory, they did prevent even greater defeat.
Several other factors combined to limit the usefulness of the new strategic reserve (the “Stalingrad” armies). First, the German forces encircled at Stalingrad held out until 2 February 1943. This prevented Rokossovsky’s armies from deploying into their new operational sectors in the period specified by the Stavka’s ambitious offensive timetable. Second, the harsh weather conditions and the early rasputitsa [thaw] wrought havoc with the Russian road and rail system and made all movement difficult if not impossible. Consequently, strategic redeployments were agonizingly slow, and offensive operations were repeatedly delayed. When they did occur, operations developed in uncoordinated fashion and with only partially assembled forces. Third, German strategic decisions had a critical impact on the outcome of the Soviet Winter Campaign. The most important of these decisions was Hitler’s appointment of von Manstein to command Army Group Don (later South) and his belated decision to permit von Manstein to conduct a maneuver defense. In addition, the German decision to abandon the
Finally, the imaginative and impulsive counterstroke launched by von Manstein in
The failed Soviet February offensive left a powerful legacy. First, it had a significant impact on the Stavka’s subsequent strategy. While planning its Summer Campaign, for the first time in the war, the Stavka displayed prudence, patience, and restraint. The ensuing plan included an initial defensive phase followed by a series of counteroffensives whose objectives were realistic and, hence, achievable. Not coincidentally, the ultimate Soviet strategic objective was the Dnieper River line. This was because the Red Army had rehearsed that scenario in the winter of 1943, and, as a result, they now had a clearer understanding of the art of the possible.
Second, the failed February offensive taught the Stavka and the Red Army’s front and army commanders indelible operational (and tactical) lessons. For example, Soviet counteroffensive planning in the summer focused on defeating the powerful German forces deployed in the
Finally, the February offensive had an effect on subsequent German operations and fortunes. First, the plan for Operation CITADELLE attempted to replicate von Manstein’s February counterstroke on an even greater scale. Ultimately German forces would attack the base of the Kursk Bulge from both north and south along the Belgorod, Kursk and the Orel, Kursk axes. The assumption was that von Manstein’s February thrust could be resumed in July with equally lethal effect. The fact that it could not evidences how much the Red Army learned from its February experiences. Second, and less important, after the failed February offensive, sizable Soviet partisan and former cavalry forces remained encircled in the Bryansk forests behind German lines. Although the Germans tried to clear this region before their July offensive, large German forces (including elements of the 4th Panzer Division) were still involved in
In the end, the Stavka’s
1. Among these many histories, only that of John Erickson mentions Soviet plans for an expanded offensive against Army Group Center. A particularly perceptive German account also detected the ultimate Soviet plan for an expanded strategic offensive in February 1943. See Generalleutnant a. D. A.D. von Plato, Die Geschichte der 5. Panzerdivision 1938 bis 1945 [The History of 5th Panzer Division from 1938 to 1945], (Regensburg: Walhalla u, Praetoria Verlag KG Georg Zwickenpflug, 1978).
2. For an account of the Donbas and Khar'kov operations, see David M. Glantz, From the Don to the Dnepr: Soviet Offensive Operations, December 1942-August 1943, (London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd, 1991). Among the few candid Soviet accounts of the Khar'kov and Donbas operations are V. P. Morozov, Zapadnee voronezha [West of Voronezh], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1956) and A. G. Ershov, Osvobozhdenie donbassa [The liberation of the Donbas], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1973). The extensive, recently released Soviet archival collections prepared during and after the war by the Soviet General Staff mention neither of the operations. Nor does this material cover the expanded February offensive in any detail.
3. On 5 July 1942, the Soviet 5th Tank Army spearheaded an unsuccessful offensive by the Bryansk Front to halt the German drive to the Don River. Although open source accounts limit this action to
4. While SATURN was to follow URANUS, the precise
5. For an account of the Voronezh-Kastornoe operation, see Ershov and the formerly classified Soviet General Staff study, «Voronezhsko-kastornenskaia nastupatel'naia operatsiia voisk voronezhskogo i levogo kryla Bryanskogo frontov» [The Voronezh-Kastornoe offensive operation of forces of the Voronezh and left wing of the Bryansk fronts], Sbornik voenno-istoricheskikh materialov Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny, vypusk 13 [Collection of military-historical materials of the Great Patriotic War, Issue 13], (Moscow: Military-historical Directorate of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff, 1954). Classified secret. Declassified 1964.
6. The First Panzer Army was transferred from the Caucasus to Army Group Don beginning on 27 January, and the Fourth Panzer Army withdrew from Rostov to the Mius River line from
7. The Don Front's 57th Army soon became the 68th Army, which was activated in the Northwest Front in February 1943.
8. A. M. Vasilevsky, Delo vsei zhizni [A lifelong cause], (Moscow: Politizdat, 1983), pp.
9. Ibid., pp.
10. Vasilevsky, Delo, pp.
11. Vasilevsky, pp.
12. Rokossovsky, pp.
13. The German Second Panzer Army's records indicate that the 48th Army forced the German 45th and 299th Infantry Divisions to abandon Droskovo (northeast of Maloiaroslavets) in heavy fighting between 8 and 12 February. By 17 February the 48th Army's forces, spearheaded by the 6th Guards and 399th Rifle Divisions, the 9th Ski Brigade, and the 43d Tank Regiment, had captured Pokrovskoe. The attack created a large salient in the German's defenses northwest of Pokrovskoe from which the 48th Army's forces threatened to cross the Neruch River and sever the
14. For accounts of the 13th, 60th, and 38th Armies' operations during this and subsequent periods, see V plameni srazhenii: boevoi put' 13-i armii [In the flames of battle: the combat path of 13th Army], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1973), pp.
15. See «Considerations concerning the conduct of the 60th Army's
Cherniakhovsky's orders read:
1. The mission of the 60th Army is to destroy the opposing enemy and reach the Arbuzova Station, Studenok, Ryl'sk, and Snagost' line by 17 February 1943, having captured the cities of L'gov, Ryl'sk, and Korenevo. Deploy the army's grouping along [the following] line: the 248th Separate Rifle Brigade on the right flank from Arbuzova to Griady with the mission of protecting the army's right flank; a shock group consisting of the 322d, 121st, and 141st Rifle Divisions, the 129th Rifle Brigade, and the 150th Tank Brigade in the center from Studenok through Ryl'sk to (excluding) Korenevo with the mission to be prepared to attack either Glukhov or Putivl'; and the104th Separate Rifle Brigade with the 8th Destroyer Brigade on the left flank in the Korenevo and Snagost' region with the mission of protecting the army's left flank. The 14th Destroyer Brigade will be kept in reserve in the Suchkino region, in anticipation of being employed to consolidate success on the central axis. The 129th Rifle Division, which is approaching late, will be used to relieve the 141st Rifle Division on the designated line, and the latter will be withdrawn into reserve in the Ivanovskoe region.
2. The concept of the operation is to deliver the main attack in the general direction of
3. The stages of the operation [are as follows]: 1st Stage
Major General Krylov, the 60th Army chief of staff
16. For details of the 2d Tank Army's difficult march see «Operativnoe marshi tankovykh i mekhaninizirovannykh soedineniii» [The operational marches of tank and mechanized formations] in Sbornik materialov po izucheniiu opyta voiny, #9 noiabr'-dekabr' 1943 g. [Collection of Materials for the Exploitation of War Experience, #9,
17. For a detailed account of the 2d Tank Army's operations, see F. I. Vysotsky, M. E. Makukhin, F. M. Sarychev, M. K. Shaposhynikov, Gvardeiskaia tankovaia [Guards tank], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1963), pp.
18. I. H. Bagramyan, Tak shli my k pobede [As we went on to victory], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1988), pp.
19. The 61st Army attacked in two sectors. The 12th Guards Rifle Division attacked north of Bolkhov but its attack failed immediately. Meanwhile, the 5th, 342d, 356th, and 283d Rifle Divisions seized a bridgehead from Chegodaevo to Gorodische east of Bolkhov and reinforced the bridgehead with the
20. The 5th Army employed its 29th Guards Rifle Division, 153d Rifle Brigade, and 153d Tank Brigade in this attack, which took place in a narrow sector northwest of Gzhatsk defended by the German 35th Infantry Division. Simultaneously, the 33d Army launched its attack southeast of Temkino with at least its 160th Rifle Division.
21. For details about Soviet conduct of the Donbas and Khar'kov operations, see David M. Glantz, From the Don to the Dnepr, (London: Frank Cass, 1991).
22. Here and elsewhere, I use the standard German Army roman numeral designation for German panzer corps numbered XXXX through XXXIX instead of XL through XLVI. The Germans used the former in their operational maps and records to avoid numerical confusion.
23. For operational and tactical detail regarding the disposition and actions of German forces throughout the operation, see Pz AOK 2, 37075/46, Chefkarten, 28 Anlagen, Anlagenband 33, Pz AOK 2, Ia, Lagenkarten 1.2.1943 — 28. 2. 1943, NAM T-313, Roll 171; Pz AOK 2, 37075/47, Chefkarten, 14 Anlagen, Pz AOK 2, Is, Lagenkarten 18. 3.1943 — 31. 3. 1943, NAM T-313, Roll 171; and AOK 2, 31811/2, Anlage zum Kriegstagebuch A. O. K. 2 — Ia, Russland Teil 9, Lagenkarten 1. Januar 1943 bis 31. Marz 1943, NAM T-312, Roll 1213. For German intelligence appreciations, see AOK 2, 31811/123, (no German title) Situation maps and overlays (1:300,000), prepared by the Second Army, Counter-intelligence Officer (Ic/AO), December 1942-July 1943, NAM T-312, Roll 1223. This intelligence material verifies the Soviet accounts of the operation and clearly indicates Soviet offensive intent.
24. For additional details of the 65th Army's operations throughout the entire period, see G. S. Nagysev, Na sluzhbe shtabnoi [In staff service], (Riga: Izdatel'stbo «Pissma», 1972), pp.
25. Batov, pp.
26. An account of the 194th Rifle Division's role in the operation is found in K. K. Shilov, Rechitskaia krasnoznamennaia [Rechitsa red banner], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1984), pp.
27. For details of the 11th Tank Corps operations, see I. I. Iushchuk, Odinnadtsatyi tankovyi korpus v boiakh za rodinu [The 11th Tank Corps in battles for the fatherland], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1962), pp.
28. Originally, the only forces opposing the exploiting the 11th Tank Corps and Kriukov's cavalry were the Hungarian 104th and 108th Light [Jager] Division, which withdrew from Sevsk westward toward the Desna River.
29. For 21st Army's role in the operation, see Po prukazu Rodiny [By order of the fatherland], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971), pp.
30. Originally, both the 62d and 64th Armies had probably been designated to reinforce the Soviet February offensive after they had completed refitting, either in Central Front's sector or elsewhere. They began their movements forward in late February and completed assembly by
31. The 1st Tank Army had been formed near Ostashkov in the Northwestern Front's sector between 30 January and 23 February 1943 around the nucleus of the 29th Army's headquarters. Initially, it consisted of one tank corps (the 6th), one mechanized corps (the 3d), a separate tank brigade (the 112th), two guards airborne divisions (the 6th and 9th), six ski brigades, and several separate tank regiments. In
The deployment of the 24th and 66th Armies to the Voronezh region is covered in Ot volzhskikh stepei do avstrilskikh al'p [From the Volga steppes to the Austrian Alps], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971), pp.
32. See «Boevoi prikaz #001 shtaba Kurskogo fronta» [Combat Order #001 of the Kursk Front's headquarters} from «Prikazy NKO i voiskam Voronezhskogo fronta (1943)» [Orders of the NKO and to the Voronezh Front's forces]. F. 417, op. 10564, d. 243, l. 12, which read:
Directive #30077 of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command, dated 19. 3. 43, forms the Kursk Front, consisting of the 60th Army, the 38th Army, and the 15th Air Army as of 2300 hours 23 March 1943. Two more armies will be included in the front in the immediate future. I am appointed as the front commander. The boundary lines are: Voronezh, Kastornoe, Kursk, and Novgorod-Severskii on the right; and (excluding) Staryi Oskol, (excluding) Kazatskoe, the Psel River, (excluding) Peschanoe, (excluding) Krasnopol'e, and (excluding) Boromlia on the left.
Commander of the Kursk Front Colonel General Reiter
Member of the front's Military Council Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Susaikov
Front chief of staff Lieutenant General Sandalov
33. See V srazheniiakh za Pobedy: Boevoi put' 38-i armii v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny
34. For example, planning time for the Stalingrad operation lasted more than one month. Thus, offensive preparations were extensive. Planning time for other operations was as follows: «Little Saturn» -- over three weeks; Ostogozhsk-Rossosh' -- about 20 days; and about one week for the Voronezh-Kastornoe and subsequent operations.
35. For details see, «Perepiski operativnogo otdela shtaba 13A co shtabom 15sd» [Correspondence of the operational department of the 13th Army's headquarters with the headquarters of the 15th Rifle Division], TsAMO, f. 361, op. 6079, d. 183, ll. 193, 204, 206, and 285.
36. «Direktivy SVGK, GSh, KA voiskam Bryanskogo fronta, 3A, 2.
37. G. F. Krivosheev, ed., Grif sekretnosti sniat: poteri vooruzhennykh sil SSR v voinakh, boevykh deistviiakh i voennyk konfliktakh {Secret classification removed: The losses of the USSR's Armed Forces in wars, military operations, and military conflicts], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1993), p. 226.
38. For the full report see «Boevaia kharakteristika 38 gv RD» [The combat characteristics of the 38th Guards Rifle Division]. TsAMO, F. 1131, op. 1, d. 3, ll.
39. See «Operativnoe svodki i boevye donesenii 350 sd» [Operational summaries and combat reports of the 350th Rifle Division], TsAMO, f. 1669, op. 1, d. 24, l. 165.
40. See «Otchety shtaba 184 rd o boevykh desistviiakh» [A headquarters 184th Rifle Division account of its combat operations]. TsAMO, f. 1435, op. 1, d. 8, l. 31.
41. These figures are taken from Krivosheev, pp.
42. «Boevaia kharakteristika na 121 sd» [Combat Characteristics of the 121st Rifle Division] from «Boevye rasporiazheniia shtaba Voronezhskogo fronta» [Combat orders of the Voronezh Front], TsAMO, f. 417, op. 10564, d. 252, l. 12.
43. Boevaiai kharakteristika na 248 otdel'nuiu kursantskuiu strelkovuiu brigadu" [Combat characterisitics of the 248th Student Rifle Brigade] from «Boevye rasporiazheniia shtaba Voronezhskogo fronta» [Combat orders of the Voronezh Front], TsAMO, f. 417, op. 10564, d. 252, l. 13.
44. «Komandiram 1, 2, 3 armeiskikh zagradotriadov. 16. 3. 43g. #0224» [Order #0224, dated 16 March 1943 to the commanders of the 1st, 2d, and 3d Army Blocking Detachments], in «Direktivy SVGK, GSh, KA voiskam Bryanskogo fronta, 13A, 2.
45. See «Prikaz chastiam 121sd #0045. 12. 3. 43.» [Order #0044 to the 121st Rifle Division's units, dated 12 March 1943] from «Boevye prikazy i pazporiazheniia soedinenii 60A
46. "Prikaz chastiam 121 sd #074. 31. 3. 43g. [Order #074 to the 121st Rifle Division's units, dated 31 March 1943] from «Boevye prikazy soedinenii 60A (1943g.)» [Combat orders to the 60th Army's formations (1943)]. TsAMO, f. 417, op. 10564, d. 251, l. 6.
47. From «Prikaz 65A. 25. 3. 43g.» [65th Army Order #4, dated 25 March 1943] in «Dokumenty iz fondov 65A» [Documents from the archives of the 65th Army]. TsAMO, f. 422, op. 10496, d. 81, l. 12.
48. See "Komandirom divizii 13A. #0144. 11. 3. 43g. [Order #0144, dated 11 March 1943, to the commanders of the 13th Army's divisions]. TsAMO, f. 361, op. 6079, d. 173, l. 80.
49. «Politupravlenie Bryanskogo fronta. 3. 2. 34g. #0523. Komanduiushchim 13 I 48 armii. Sovershenno sekretno»[Order #0523, dated 3 February 1943, of the Bryansk Front's Political Directorate. To the commanders of the 13th and 48th Armies. Top secret from Direktivy SVGK, GSh, KA voiskam Bryanskogo fronta, 13A (2.
50. «Iz direktivy Voennogo Soveta Bryanskogo fronta komanduiushchemu 13 armii (kopiia komanduuishchemu 3 armii. 4. 2. 43g.» [From a directive of the Bryansk Front's Military Council to the 13th Army commander, dated 4 February 1943, with a copy to the 3d Army commander], from «Direktivy SVGK» [Directives of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command], TsAMO, f. 361, op. 6079, d. 173, l 74.
51. «Prikaz voiskam Bryanskogo fronta #31/2. 1. 2. 43g. Sekretno» [Order #31/2 to the Bryansk Front's forces, dated 1 February 1943. Secret] from «Direktivy SVGK» [Directives of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command], TsAMO, f. 361, op. 6079, d. 174, l. 70.
52. "Iz direktivy Voennogo Soveta Bryanskogo fronta ot 6.2 43g. komanduiushchim, chlennam Voennykh Sovetov, nachal'nikam politotdelov armii [From a 6 February order of the Bryansk Front's Military Council to the commanders, members of the Military Councils, and political workers of the armies] from «Direktivy SVGK» [Directives of the Stavka of the Supreme high Command], TsAMO, f. 361, op. 6079, d. 174, l. 79.
53. "Iz direktivy Voennogo Soveta Bryanskogo fronta ot 17. 2. 43g. [From a 17 February 1943 directive of the Bryansk Front's Military Council] from «Direktivy SVGK» [Directives of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command], TsAMO, f. 361, op. 6079, d. 174, I. 87.
54. «Direktivy i prikazy SVGK. Genshtaba Kr. Ar. Bryanskogo fronta voiskam» [Directives and orders of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command to the Bryansk Front's forces]. TsAMO, f. 361, op. 6079, d. 174. l. 35.
55. «Direktivy SVGK, GSh, KA voiskam Bryanskogo fronta, 13A, 2.
56. Ibid., l. 164.
57. Direktiva Voennogo Soveta Tsentral'nogo fronta #027 ot 18. 4. 43g. [Directive #027 of the Central Front's Military Council of 18. 4. 43]: [l. 166]
58. General Tarasov was killed in action in Hungary in October 1944 while serving as deputy commander of the 53d Army.
Author: David M. Glantz